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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF UTAH, in the 
interest 
of 
RICHARDS., a person 
under eighteen years 
of age. 
CASE NO. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
16219 
This is an appeal from the Findings and Con-
clusions and the Order entered on December 12, 1978, 
by Judge L. Roland Anderson of the First Judicial Dis-
trict Juvenile Court for Weber County, State of Utah. 
Specifically, appellant appeals the trial court's find-
ing that he can be required to pay for damages sustained 
by five motor vehicles when appellant was only convicted 
of damaging one of the vehicles. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On September 8, 1978, a petition was filed 
in the juvenile court charging appellant with unlawfully 
entering one motor home with the intent to commit a 
felony or a theft (Legal File 2). On September 20, 
1978, appellant was arraigned on this charge and entered 
a plea of true. As a result, the juvenile court re-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
committed appellant to the State Youth Development Center, 
nunc pro tunc September 4, 1978 (Legal File 4). 
On October 16, 1978, a second petition was 
filed in the juvenile court charging appellant with four· 
counts of intentionally damaging four motor homes (Legal 
File 6). Appellant denied these charges and trial was 
set for November 21, 1978. On that date the court 
granted a preliminary motion made by appellant's counsel 
and dismissed all four charges contained in the October 
16th petition (Legal File 12). However, on November 
21, 1978 and December 12, 1978, the court held a res-
titution hearing and ruled that appellant could be order-
ed to pay for damages suffered by all five motor homes -
not only the one which appellant admitted damaging in 
his September 20th arraignment, but also the four which 
appellant was never convicted of having damaged (Legal 
File 13). Based on this finding of liability, the 
court recommended to the State Youth Development Center 
that payment of full restitution be made a condition 
of appellant's parole (Legal File 17). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks this Court to reverse the 
trial court's finding that he can be required to pay 
restitution for damages suffered by five vehicles when 
he admitted damaging one of them and all charges re-
lating to damage to the other four vehicles were dis-
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missed. Stemming from such a reversal, appellant also 
asks this Court tonullifythe trial court's recommenda-
tion to the State Youth Development Center that payment 
of restitution for all five vehicles be made a condition 
of his parole from the institution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 16, 1978, five motor homes on the 
premises of Freeway Mazda in Riverdale, Utah were 
allegedly broken into and damaged. Following police 
investigation of the incident, the county attorney 
filed a petition in juvenile court on September 8, 1978, 
charging that "on or about the 16th day of August, 
1978, (appellant) did unlawfully enter a vehicle with 
intent to commit a felony or theft therein, to-wit: 
a motor home" (Legal File 2). On September 20, 1978, 
appellant was arraigned on this charge and entered a 
plea of true. As a result of this plea, he was re-
committed to the State Youth Development Center (here-
inafter State School) effective September 4, 1978. 
The instant controversy began at the September 
20th arraignment when the probation officer, Kathleen 
weaver, attempted to make a recommendation to the court 
as to the amount of restitution which appellant should 
be required to pay. She noted that five trailers had 
been broken into on August 16th and that she was not 
certain which one appellant had been charged with and 
had admitted damaging (Transcript 2). Because there was 
-<-
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a wide range in the amount of financial damages s·ustained 
by the different trailers, she asked that the matter 
of restitution be continued until she could make a 
further investigation into which one of them appellant 
had been charged with breaking into. 
Ms. Weaver's subsequent attempts to determine 
which vehicle appellant had been charged with damaging 
apparently caused the county attorney to re-examine the 
police report (Transcript. 10) and realize that five 
vehicles were damaged on August 16th. Thus, on October 
16th, a second petition, containing four individual 
charges, was filed. For each of the four charges, the 
petition alleged that "on or about the 16th day of 
August, 1978, (appellant) did intentionally damage, 
deface or destroy the property of Freeway Mazda, to-wit: 
(a description of the individual vehicle), causing pe-
cuniary loss less than $250.00." Appellant was arraigned 
on these charges on October 25th and denied any in-
volvement with these four motor homes. Trial was set 
for November 21st, and disposition on the first petition 
was continued to that date. 
At the time set for trial, appellant's counsel 
moved, pursuant to Section 76-1-402(2), Utah Code 
Annotated (1973), to dismiss all four charges in the 
October 16th petition. This motion was based on the 
-4-
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fact that whenever conduct establishes separate offenses 
under a single criminal episode, and the offenses are 
within the jurisdiction of a single court, and the 
offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the 
time the defendant is arraigned on the first charge, 
the defendant shall not be subject to separate trials 
for multiple offenses (Transcript 14 and 15). The 
county attorney admitted that the instant situation 
was the type contemplated by the statute (see state-
ments of Mr. Gladwell, Transcript. 15, and particularly 
his admission "[i)nitially we ••• did have access to 
all of the reports ••• ") but argued that the juvenile 
court should not follow the statute in this instance. 
The court did not agree with his argument, and ruled 
that there was no question that the charges should 
be dismissed (Transcript 17). Hence all charges re-
lating to damages to the motor homes listed in the 
October 16th petition were dismissed. 
The reason this case is now before this Court 
is that, after dismissing these charges, the trial 
court went on to say that appellant could be held 
liable for damages to all five motor homes. (See 
statements of the court on pages 17, 21, 28, 32 and 
33 of Transcript, and on pages 13 and 17 of Legal File). 
The court ruled this despite the fact that there was 
no evidentiary hearing on whether appellant had caused 
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any damage to the four vehicles, and despite the fact 
that the court was barred from considering any such 
evidence, if it did exist, by the fact that the court 
itself had just dismissed those charges. 
Over repeated objections of appellant's 
counsel that the court did not have the power to hold 
him liable for damages to all five trailers (Transcript. 
21, 26, 27, 31, 32) the court proceeded to conduct a 
restitution hearing to determine the financial loss 
suffered by each trailer. Part of this hearing was 
conducted on November 21st (Transcript 19-29). The 
remainder of the hearing was held on December 12, 1978, 
in order to give Mr. Cutrubus, the owner of Freeway 
Mazda, an opportunity to check with his insurance 
company and determine the exact amount of loss (Transcript 
31 and 32). 
Again reaffirming its ruling that appellant 
was legally responsible for damages to all five vehicles, 
the court set a total restitution figure of $607.00 
(Transcript 32). The court then entered an order rec-
ommending that payment of the full $607.00 be made a 
condition of appellant's parole when he is released from 
the State School (Legal File 17). His release from 
the State School should occur sometime in the late 
spring of 1979. 
-6-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES TO 
FIVE MOTOR HOMES WHEN HE WAS ONLY 
CONVICTED OF DAMAGING ONE. 
The juvenile court's power to make restitu-
tion orders flows from the language of Section 78-la-39(7), 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), which states that "(t]he 
court may order that the child be required to repair 
or replace or to otherwise make restitution for damage 
or loss caused by his wrongful act ••. " (Emphasis added.) 
Thus the court does have the authority to require a child 
who is under the court's jurisdiction to pay for losses 
which are caused by acts which the child has either 
admitted doing or has been convicted of doing. 
Further understanding of the meaning of 
restitution can be obtained by examining the adult 
criminal code. In setting forth the permissible con-
ditions of probation which a court can impose, Section 
77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated (1953), states that the 
defendant" ... may be required to make restitution or 
reparation to the aggrieved party or parties for the 
actual damages or losses caused by the offense to which 
the defendant has pleaded guilty or for which conviction 
was had ... "(Emphasis added.) 
Nowhere do either of these statutes permit a 
court to require an individual to pay for damages 
which are not shown to have been caused by specific acts 
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of that individual. The court's action in the instant 
case, in dismissing the charges that appellant damaged 
the four motor homes and then going ahead and finding 
that he is liable for the damages sustained by these 
four vehicles, is clearly unwarranted and arbitrary, 
and amounts to a violation of appellant's rights to 
due process of law. The United States Supreme Court, 
pointing out that the due process clause is rule of 
fairness that protects a citizen from arbitrary denial 
of his rights, has consistently applied the due process 
clause as a bar to arbitrary state action. 
In Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 
100 (1960), the Court held that due process was denied 
when a state convicted an individual without intro-
ducing any evidence. In its decision, the Court cited 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948), in which it was 
declared to be as much a violation of due process to 
send an accused to prison following conviction on a 
charge on which he was never tried as it would be to 
convict him upon a charge that was never made. Cole 
involved convictions in a state court under §2 of a 
statutue where on appeal to the state Supreme Court that 
court affirmed a conviction based on §1 of the statute. 
The United States Supreme Court held that such an 
affirmance had the effect of convicting defendants 
without a trial and was therefore a der1ial of procedural 
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due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. There 
would seem to be little difference between convictinq an 
accused of a charge for which he was not tried and 
the instant situation of finding that appellant can 
be made to pay for damages to property he was not con-
victed of harming. 
The net effect of the trial court's action 
is that it has imposed multiple fines upon appellant 
for his admission to the charg~ of having damaged one 
trailer. Such action violates his rights to be free 
from double jeopardy. (See amend. V, u.s. Con3t; and 
Breed v. Jones, 421 u.s. 519 (1975), extending the double jeopardy 
right to juveniles.) The Supreme Court, in Ex Parte 
Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall) 163 (1873), clearly pointed 
out that the doctrine of double jeopardy prohibits 
multiple punishments for a single offense. Additionally, 
the Court has noted that excessive penalties for a 
single offense are also a denial of constitutional 
rights. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 143 (1907). The 
trial court has patently offended these principles by 
finding that an individual guilty of damaging one 
trailer should pay for damages to five trailers. The 
court's arbitrary action in punishing appellant for four 
charges for which he was never convicted offends the 
most fundamental notions of due process and fair play. 
-9-
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Hence its ruling that appellant is legally responsible 
for the full $607.00 in restitution should be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT MISCONSTRUED THE CONCEPT 
OF SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE WHEN IT USED 
IT AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR FINDING APPELLANT 
RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES TO ALL FIVE MOTOR 
HOMES. 
The trial court attempted to justify its 
finding that appellant is responsible for the damage 
to all five vehicles by saying that because they were 
apparently damaged in the same criminal episode, ap-
pellant should pay restitution on all of them. (Tran-
script 32; Legal File 17). The court applied this 
reasoning despite the fact that five separate charges 
were filed against appellant, one of which he admitted 
and four of which were dismissed. It is unclear exactly 
why the court thought that the single criminal episode 
statute supported this type of finding. 
An examination of the single criminal episode 
statute produces nothing which vindicates the manner 
in which the trial court applied it. Section 76-1-402(1), 
Utah Code Annotated (1973) states: 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a 
single criminal episode for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different 
-10-
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provisions of the code, the act shall 
be punishable under only one such pro-
vision; an acquittal or conviction and 
sentence under any such provision bars 
a prosecution under any other such 
provision. 
One of the primary purposes of this statute is to pro-
tect a defendant from being punished in several ways 
for the commission of one wrongful act. For example, 
a defendant who pleads guilty to assault with a deadly 
weapon cannot also be prosecuted for the lesser in-
cluded offense of simple assault. State v. Hunter, '437 
P.2d 208 (Utah 1968). The statute does allow a defen-
dant to be prosecuted in one criminal action for each 
separate offense he committed in the same criminal 
episode. State v. Eichler, 584 P.2d 861 (Utah 1978). 
The single criminal episode statute does not 
support the ruling of the trial court in the case at 
bar. It does not say that a defendant can be prosecuted 
for one of the offenses which occurred in the criminal 
episode and then found guilty of the rest of the offenses 
without being charged with them. Nor does it state that 
an accused who admits one of the separate offenses, 
following which the court dismisses charges for the other 
offenses, can be held responsible for damages caused 
by each of the separate offenses. The court's use of 
the single criminal episode theory assumes that a charged 
offense and its concomitant penalty can be separ~ted. 
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The notion that a punishment can be imposed without 
the supportive structure of an actual charge offends 
essential requirements of due process. Again, the 
court's finding that appellant is responsible for any 
losses over those sustained by the one motor home 
which he admitted damaging is erroneous and should be 
reversed. 
POINT III 
BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS COMMITTED TO THE 
STATE YOUTH DEVELOPMENT CENTER PRIOR 
TO HIS RESTITUTION HEARING, THE ENTIRE 
ISSUE OF RESTITUTION WAS BEYOND THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT. 
In addition to the reasons discussed in 
points one and two which mandate reversal of the trial 
court's ruling, there is a fundamental question as to 
whether the court had the power to enter any form of 
ruling on the issue of restitution. This Court has 
held that the juvenile court is a statutory court which 
has only those powers specifically granted to it by the 
Juvenile Court Act, Section 78-3a-l et. seq., Utah Code 
Annotated. R v. Whitmer, 515 P.2d 617 (Utah 1973). 
Section 40(2) of that Act states that the jurisdiction 
of the juvenile court terminates "upon commitment to 
the state industrial school for an indeterminate period 
in excess of 90 days." That type of commitment order 
was entered in this case at appellant's arraignment on 
the first petition on September 20, 1978, to be effective 
-12-
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nunc pro tunc September 4, 1978 (Legal File 4). Thus, 
after that date the juvenile court lost jurisdiction 
over appellant. It did not have the authority to hold 
subsequent restitution hearings, nor to make the rec-
ommendation to the State School that payment of restitu-
tion be made a condition of appellant's parole. 
The trial court, commenting on the issue of 
jurisdiction, stated that the juvenile court retains 
jurisdiction to determine restitution even after a youth 
is committed to the State School (Transcript 17). How-
ever, the language of Section 7B-3a-40(2) is absolute 
when it discusses termination of the court's jurisdic-
tion: it does not provide for this type of partial 
retention of jurisdiction. 
Case law on the extent of the juvenile court's 
jurisdiction in this situation is relatively limited. 
It is helpful to review the following three cases for 
the analogies they offer on the meaning of a juvenile 
court's limited jurisdiction. In In the Matter of A 
N , 5JO S.W.2d 284 (Mo. App. 1973), the court held 
that an order suspending the commitment of a juvenile, 
and placing him instead with his mother, was void and 
beyond the statutory powers of the juvenile court. The 
statute gave the juvenile court the power to commit 
a child to an institution, or to place a child on home 
probation, but not to do both at once. Because the 
-11-
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court's action was not specifically authorized by the 
statute, it was invalid. The court emphasized that 
" ••• the juvenile courts are courts of limited jurisdic-
tion and may exercise only such powers as are conferred 
by statute." 500 S.W.2d at 287. 
A more recent Missouri case again affirms 
this insistence that a juvenile court may only do those 
things which it has been specifically authorized to do 
by statute. In State of Missouri ex rel B C C v. 
Conley, 568 S.W.2ct 608 (1978), the youth had been 
committed to the state training school. Because the 
Missouri statute stated that such commitment terminated 
the juvenile court's jurisdiction, the appellate court 
ruled that the juvenile court could not make an order 
affecting the youth unless jurisdiction was returned 
to it in an appropriate proceeding. 
One final case which is helpful to examine 
is Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County, Etc., 572 P.2d 
451 (Ariz. App. 1977). There the issue was whether the 
juvenile court had exceeded its statutory authority by 
simultaneously ordering the juvenile committed to the 
Department of Correction, suspending the commitment, 
and continuing the juvenile on probation. Because none 
of the sections of the statute provided the court with 
the power to enter such an order, the appellate court 
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ruled the order void, noting that " ••• the power of the 
juvenile court to make a particular disposition of a 
delinquent child is limited in that it must be express-
ly granted by legislative act." 572 P.2d at 452. 
Applying these principles to the instant case, 
itappears that the trial court indeed lacked the 
statutory authority to conduct the restitution hear-
ing. While Section 78-3a-39(7) allows a juvenile court 
to make restitution orders, this section only applies 
to those youths who are within the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court. By virtue of Section 78-3a-40(2), 
the juvenile court's jurisdiction over appellant ter-
minated when he was committed to the State School on 
September 20, 1978. Thus the trial court had no power 
to rule that appellant could be held legally responsible 
for damages to each of the five motor homes. 
Additionally, it was not within the trial 
court's power to recommend to the State School that 
payment of $607.00 in restitution be made a condition 
of appellant's parole. Aside from the above discussed 
problem with the court even considering the restitution 
issue, it is not within the province of the juvenile 
court to determine conditions of parole. For practical 
purposes, a "recommendation" from the juvenile court 
will be interpreted by the officials at the State School 
as a directive with which they must comply. Having to structure 
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a juvenile's parole around a prior order of the court 
will interfere with the ability to fashion a parole 
contract around the particular needs of the juvenile 
at the time he is released from the institution. Such 
interference is discordant with the rehabilitative 
goals of the entire juvenile justice system. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant is not legally responsible for 
the damages sustained by five individual motor homes 
when he only admitted damaging one of them. All 
charges relating to the other four vehicles were dis-
missed by the trial court. The trial court is clearly 
incorrect in stating that appellant is liable for all 
losses solely because the five vehicles were damaged 
in one criminal episode. Damage to each of the trailers 
was a separate criminal offense - appellant is only 
responsible for one of those offenses. For these 
reasons, and for the more fundamental reason that the 
trial court lost jurisdiction over appellant and did 
not have the statutory authority to conduct a restitution 
hearing, appellant respectfully asks this Court to 
reverse the lower court's ruling that he is liable 
for damages to the five motor homes. 
DATED this g -:J_ day of ¥Z:- __ fi , 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Jf\- E A-: MARQ0ARD 
A torney for Appellant 
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